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In the neoliberal era, precarity has become a 
general condition in the life of workers. The 
structural precarisation of labour is a global 
process, which has taken place heterogeneously 
according to national contexts, sectors, 
qualifications, and labour market stratifications. 
This essay looks at precarity from two angles: 
the impact of it on migrant workers and the role 
of migration in the exacerbation and extension 
of it.
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Turning precarity into a general condition 
in the life of workers is one of the most 
important social transformations of the 
neoliberal era. The structural precarisation 
of labour is a global process, which has 
taken place heterogeneously according to 
national contexts, sectors, qualifications, 
and labour market stratifications. Besides 
young people, low-skilled older workers, 
and women, it has mainly affected migrants, 
who have suffered from labour precarity 
combined with the weakness of their 
legal and social status. At the same time, 
immigration is also involuntarily an agent 
of spreading and widening precarisation—
often a testing ground where new forms of 
precarity are trialled before being extended 
to other groups of workers.
In this essay, I look at precarity from two 
angles: the impact of it on migrant workers 
and the role of migration in the exacerbation 
and extension of it. I first analyse the 
process of structural precarisation of labour, 
highlighting how it has become even more 
extreme in recent years. I then examine the 
precarisation of migration in Europe over 
the past two decades and its role in paving 
the way for a wider enlargement of precarity. 
Finally, I consider the Italian context as a 
striking example of this two-fold process. 
This analysis is highly relevant if we wish to 
better understand what has been happening 
in China since the onset of the reform era. 
In fact, while the Chinese context has 
arisen from a specific set of conditions 
(economic, social, political, and cultural), 
it nevertheless presents many similarities 
with the Italian context regarding the social 
transformations, the new inequalities, and 
the conditions of migrant workers.
Precarity 2.0
One of the cornerstones of the great 
social restructuring of the past three 
decades is the widespread and intense 
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transformation of the organisation of work 
and of the labour market—a composite yet 
unitary process (Head 2003; Doogan 2009; 
Art 2011; Antunes 2013). The features of 
these transformations may be summed up 
as follows: 1) organisational flexibility, i.e. 
the set of methods—from lean production 
to outsourcing, from just-in-time to new 
management—which have produced 
the fragmentation and acceleration of 
production processes; 2) the systematic 
application of informatics and robotics to 
the production process, which has increased 
the polarisation of work and the de-skilling 
of a number of workers; and 3) the structural 
precarisation of labour. 
As one of the cores of neoliberal policies, 
the precarisation of labour is a prerequisite 
and a carrier of the intensification of labour 
exploitation required by the rules of the 
global economic order in response to the 
constant decrease of accumulation rates 
and recurring economic crisis. The fracture 
in the unity of the labour contract, the 
restructuring of labour law, the introduction 
of a plethora of contract types with different 
conditions and rights, are all part of a 
process which is broader and deeper than a 
mere reduction of guaranteed work spaces. 
Following a few decades in the wake of 
the Second World War, which saw the 
attainment of relatively stable and secure 
jobs, a radical and extreme commodification 
of labour has taken place.
The structural precarisation of labour 
has several consequences—including 
new stratifications, the growth in wage 
inequalities, the impoverishment of 
many groups of workers, the increase in 
the army of reserve workers (with the 
creation of a reserve of the reserve), the 
unconditional adaptation of workers’ lives 
to the organisational needs of private 
companies and public bodies, the alteration 
of social rights which have been readjusted 
for the benefit of companies, and the 
deterioration of psychological and physical 
health as precarity gradually destroys 
people. Atypical contracts, at first applied 
among migrants, have fragmented and 
disconnected the labour force, enabling the 
general devaluation of labour, denying the 
role of workers in the process of production. 
The consequences have been so dire that 
rather than describing this as simply 
commodification of labour, in extreme cases 
we can actually conceptualise it as the 
nullification of labour and of the worker, 
who does not have and does not need to 
have anything guaranteed, who—exactly as 
migrant workers in racist representations—
have zero rights. 
With the recent economic crisis and the 
consequent radicalisation of neoliberal 
policies, labour precarisation has further 
expanded and deepened, going beyond 
precarity as it was known in the recent 
past. Now, precarity 2.0—typified by 
vouchers, meal tickets instead of wages, 
serial internships, volunteering, unpaid 
work, zero-hour contracts, temporary 
work, posted workers, fake cooperatives—
has transcended the original boundaries of 
precarious labour, replacing a segment of 
the ‘first generation’ precarious jobs and 
becoming the norm.
The precarisation of labour, both in its old 
and new versions, has been unleashed on 
workers unevenly. The first, most affected, 
were migrants, young people, low-skilled 
and low-educated female workers with 
children, older workers affected by company 
restructuring, and then other low-skilled 
workers more generally—i.e. those who 
constitute the most vulnerable segment of 
the European working class. These groups, 
which do not constitute an individual class 
of their own, have experienced increased 
impoverishment and marginalisation, and 
their foreign components have also been the 
subjects of racist campaigns (Flecker 2007; 
Art 2011). 
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Precarisation of 
Migration in Europe
Across the majority of mainland Europe, 
the precarisation of labour has markedly 
affected migrants. There are at least three 
primary reasons for this: the migration 
policies of many European countries; the 
role attached to migration in European 
capitalisms and in the operation of the 
labour market; and the rise of anti-migrant 
racism in the 2000s. 
In several European countries, migrant 
workers are subject to a double precarisation, 
both in the work and legal sphere (Morris 
2002; Schierup et al. 2015). With regard to 
the legal sphere in particular, the migration 
policies of many countries subordinate the 
migrants’ right of abode to the existence 
of a work contract, and also tie their 
social rights to their migration status, thus 
stratifying social rights. These principles 
have contributed to the return of the ‘guest 
worker’, which has taken place in a context of 
flexible capitalism with all its fragmentation 
and polarisation. The generalisation of 
the bond between the residence permit 
and the work contract during a period of 
structural economic crisis and casualisation 
puts migrants in a perilous and blackmail 
position, forcing them to accept any work 
conditions. The interaction between these 
two dimensions has produced, compared to 
the previous decades, a larger and deeper 
precarisation of migrants’ conditions. 
These migrants, torn between the rigidity 
determined by migration laws and the 
flexibility produced by labour laws, have 
found themselves as ‘guest workers’ 
attempting to navigate a context of economic 
stagnation, characterised by atypical 
contracts and the general weakening of the 
workers’ movement. Thus, if for the 1960s 
and 1970s we may talk about a relatively 
stable work regime, in the following decades 
the reality is that of a precarisation of the 
very process of work  insertion and, on the 
social part, the enhancement of exclusion or 
segregation factors. 
Historically, migration has been allocated 
the role of a reserve army and social buffer 
against possible crises within European 
capitalisms (Castles 2000; Schierup et al. 
2006). In the last decade, this has intensified, 
so that migrant workers have been the first 
group experimented on with regard to the 
shift to precarious work and to the most 
extreme forms of precarity. In the meantime, 
the operating mechanisms of the labour 
market—selection, concentration, and 
specialisation—have continued to channel a 
good share of migrant workers into the most 
precarious and less paid sectors. This means 
that, in Europe, their working conditions—
from access to work to unemployment, 
from tasks to wages, from classification to 
mobility—still present disparities compared 
to national workers. There are large swaths 
of unemployment, underemployment, ‘over-
education’, and atypical contracts—all of 
which have become higher in percentage 
over time, and which have grown alongside 
crises (OECD 2013 and 2015). 
The rise of institutional racism has 
increased precarisation and reduced social 
rights. The anti-migration offensive has 
supported migration policies characterised 
by a mix of identity and security elements—
aimed at curbing social rooting, and at 
supporting temporary and fluctuating 
migration, following the requests for a 
just-in-time workforce. The return of 
assimilationism, both in policy and rhetoric, 
has required maximum social adaptation by 
migrants to the conditions to which they 
are subjected. Mass media, in creating a 
racialised depiction of society, has served 
to produce a differentiation in the public 
representations of migrants which is 
functional to the differentiated exploitation 
deriving from their stratified precarity. 
Slogans and discourses focussed on a 
necessarily temporary presence, preference 
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for national workers, and on a subordinated 
integration of migrants in the name of social 
inferiority, have paved the way for the 
precarisation affecting a vast majority of 
migrants as a racialised class segment of the 
European working class.  
At the same time, the role of migration as a 
carrier of precarisation must be highlighted. 
The labour market is segmented, but 
the spreading of precarity among 
migrant workers has been a factor of the 
multiplication and enlargement of precarity 
that has affected a remarkable share of 
workers. In this framework, migration 
policies have played an important general 
role in paving the way and anticipating 
comparable labour laws (Basso 2004; Morice 
and Potot 2010). 
The process of downward convergence of 
migration policies—starting slowly in the 
1970s and 1980s, and gaining momentum 
in the 1990s and 2000s—has affected a 
fair share of European states and has seen 
the confluence of the different migration 
policies into one single migration policy, 
which is selective, restrictive, and repressive, 
and which balances new migrant arrivals 
according to the needs of the labour market 
(Basso 2014). Such processes have been 
accompanied by unceasing denigration 
campaigns targeting different groups of 
migrants, which have ended up affecting 
migration as a whole and, subsequently, a 
large share of the world’s labour, dividing it 
along distinct lines of differentiation. 
In this context, where migration 
is encouraged by the market and 
discouraged by institutions—according to 
a role play aimed at the social and political 
exploitation of migrants—the real purpose 
of this downward  migration policy is not 
a complete stop to immigration, but rather 
an unstable, vulnerable immigration, which 
serves as a general devaluation of labour. 
Historically, the use of a migrant labour 
force has been one of the main leverages 
for the devaluation of the labour force as a 
whole. By lowering the cost of labour and 
by offering an ultra-flexible workforce, 
migrants are forced into a subordinated 
position, and are liable to blackmail 
by migration policies and institutional 
discrimination (Potts 1990). Today, this 
specific situation has turned migration 
into a laboratory where the manufacturing 
system has experimented with new forms of 
organising work—conceived of as a means of 
increasing profitability and productivity—
which have led to replacing secure jobs with 
precarious ones.
Migration and labour policies increasingly 
aimed at precarity have gone hand-in-hand. 
The creation of an institutionally weak and 
precarious proletariat, of an underclass of 
temporary workers replacing each other in 
constant rotation and circulation, has not 
only allowed the experimentation with new 
forms of labour exploitation to spread, but 
has also favoured a new global regulation 
of work relations and contracts in the 
name of stable precarity. The production of 
undocumented migrants, for instance, is an 
integral part of the structural precarisation 
of labour.
The Italian Case 
The hectic pace of labour market 
reformation, which has taken place in Italy 
over the past two decades, has legalised 
all forms of precarisation, many of which 
were first trialled on migrant workers. 
From the July 1993 agreement between 
the Government and trade unions, which 
paved the way for fixed-term and temporary 
employment, to the Jobs Act in 2014, which 
has institutionalised precarity by turning it 
into the norm rather than the exception, the 
task of creating a precarious labour market 
has been carried out in a bipartisan fashion 
through the promulgation of a long list of laws 
and provisions that have affected both ‘work 
flexibility’ and ‘employment flexibility’.
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Simultaneously, immigration law has 
gradually established the connection 
between residence permits, work contracts, 
and housing—institutionalising a migrant 
work model based on forced illegality and 
social precarity. Law 40/1998 has explicitly 
legitimised the existing social practices, 
confirming that undocumented migration 
is unavoidable for migrants and that 
regularisation can only happen afterwards 
(with amnesties or specific decrees) 
according to the will of the employers. Law 
189/2002—which dictates that residence is 
strictly subordinated to employment—has 
redefined, restrictively, the prerequisites 
to right of abode with the introduction of 
a ‘stay contract’, thus creating a form of 
immigration that is extremely susceptible to 
blackmail. This has placed the vast majority 
of migrants in a condition of structural, 
legal, and social precarity solidified by 
the labour law itself. The creation of an 
unbreakable bond between employment, 
residence permits, and housing guarantees 
means that migrants’ destinies are, to a large 
extent, in the hands of the employer—the 
only person who may legitimately ask for a 
working permit for migrants and who has 
the subjective right to ask for a residence 
permit. Law 94/2009 has further worsened 
migrant conditions by introducing a point-
based residence permit, articulated in 
credits. As in a game of snakes and ladders, 
during the validity of the residence permit, 
migrants can obtain or lose points that will 
count towards the permit’s renewal. 
The fragmentation of residence permits 
types and the multiple durations of 
residence permits stipulated by immigration 
laws—combined with the different kinds of 
atypical contracts stipulated by labour laws—
have determined a marked stratification of 
the legal and social status of migrants. In 
other words, different types of migrants 
are granted, with several categories with 
different rights and conditions, which 
trigger a hierarchy of precarity within the 
very same migrant populations.
Pedagogy of Precarity 
and New Forms of 
Casualisation
Throughout the 1990s migrants have been 
channelled into the worst jobs, especially 
in labour-intensive sectors, with a high 
rate of irregular work. The shift to the 
industrial sector of the 2000s has entailed 
an improvement in the condition of migrant 
workers, yet they still take up proportionally 
more low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Migrant 
participation in the official labour market 
has increased, but the racial segmentation of 
the labour market has grown, and is matched 
by labour segregation and ethnicisation 
in the manufacturing processes. The 
manufacturing system, characterised by 
small and medium units, drawing on the 
more unstable or marginal segments in the 
labour market, has had a permanent reserve 
of cheap workers with which it could 
support the new forms of organisation of 
work. The working experience of migrants—
with regard to tasks, classification, wages, 
accidents, and social security—presents 
severe disparities in comparison with 
national workers (Centro Studi e Ricerche 
IDOS 2012). Among them, we encounter 
the highest rates of unemployment (16.2 
percent for migrants versus 11.4 percent for 
national workers), underemployment (11.7 
percent versus 4.2 percent), over-education 
(40.9 percent versus 21.6 percent), contract 
precarity, and intermittent work (Centro 
Studi e Ricerche IDOS 2016).
This situation results in mass socialisation 
to precarity. As migrants enter the labour 
force, running the gauntlet of irregular 
work and undocumented migration before 
reaching a minimally stable situation, they 
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often spend a long period experiencing the 
most exploitative labour practices in the 
country. In a sense, this can be considered 
a sort of ‘warming-up’ phase for permanent 
uncertainty and social inferiority. This 
stage, which affects migrants differently 
according to various factors, prepares them 
for a lifetime of precarious work. This is 
the cornerstone of Italy’s labour migration 
regime. This pedagogy of precarity is a 
pillar of the subjugation of migrants that 
began in the 1980s and 1990s, and was 
institutionalised in the 2000s. In terms of 
socialisation, it has enlarged to create a sort 
of halo effect that has affected other groups 
of workers, who at first had witnessed the 
precarisation of migrants thinking it would 
only be limited to them. 
In this context, migrants have been the 
‘guinea pigs’ for new forms of precarisation. 
Work paid with vouchers—used in Italy until 
March 2017 and currently under reform—is 
just one example. This is a remuneration 
arrangement for accessory occasional work 
that entails a remuneration of ten euros per 
hour before tax. Vouchers have no relation 
to a work contract, do not guarantee a day 
off, paid leave, sick leave, unemployment 
benefits, maternity or marriage leave, 
family benefits, nor loss-of-job indemnities. 
At first, in 2003, they were used for a few 
occasional activities carried out by specific 
categories (after-school tutoring, side jobs 
for students, and retired people), but later 
found wide application in sectors featuring 
a high rate of migrant labour—including 
domestic work, care work, and seasonal 
work in agriculture (harvesting). In 2015, 115 
million vouchers were sold, corresponding 
to 1.1 billion euros, a third of which were 
used in the construction sector, and half in 
trade, tourism, and services (Bombelli et al. 
2016). Vouchers then became a ‘universal’ 
tool, across all sectors, used for several jobs 
and for activities that are not necessarily 
occasional, and has partly replaced 
fixed-term precarious contracts. From a 
remuneration arrangement, it transformed 
into an employment arrangement, but in 
such evolution cases, the work relation no 
longer exists, channelling workers into a 
situation of extreme precarity. 
Advocating a Global 
Social Citizenship
There is a close connection between 
work transformations and alteration of 
social rights, between labour precarisation 
and social rights stratification. The effects 
of organisation flexibility and of contract 
precarity are not only visible in the hyper 
segmentation of the labour market and the 
rapid growth of under-employed people, but 
can also be seen in the erosion of labour rights 
and the restriction of social citizenship. In 
the case of migrants, labour precarity entails 
a considerable exclusion or segregation 
factor, as the exercise of social rights is 
often subordinated to the work contract 
or the residence permit. The return of the 
‘guest worker’ and the preference by states 
and markets for temporary migration, have 
favoured—in an era of structural precarity—a 
limited and conditional acquisition of social 
rights, generating new forms of inequality 
and a framework of stratified rights. All of 
this is supported by a strong xenophobia in 
the name of the welfare state (Spire 2013; 
Burnett 2015). The attack on the social 
rights of the citizen has been going on for 
at least two decades as a fully-fledged state 
policy aimed at altering the very structure 
and functions of these rights. Even though 
it started in the migration sphere, it has not 
been confined there, and has expanded to 
other segments of the population. For this 
reason, it is high time to consider the idea 
of a global social citizenship that may curb 
this downward slide into a future defined by 
structural precarity. 
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